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Is there anything more to be said about the conflict between science and religion? Nu-
merous peace efforts have tried to reconcile both parties, but their territorial disputes 
refuse to settle down. In Religion and the Sciences of Origins, philosopher and Christian 
apologist Kelly James Clark focuses on questions about origins (of life, the universe, and 
everything), one notable area where the “religious rubber meets the science road” (Clark 
2014:7). After sketching the possible models for thinking about science and religion as he 
sees them (Conflict, Separation, and Integration), Clark discusses a number of episodes in 
the history of the conflict—the Scientific Revolution, the Galileo affair, the reception of 
Darwin’s theory—and moves on to some miscellaneous topics in the second half: fine-tun-
ing arguments, the effect of religion on society, dualism and the existence of the soul, the 
foundations of morality, free will, and science/religion in Judaism and Islam.  Borrowing 
the medieval metaphor of the Doctrine of the Two Books, Clark maintains that there is no 
genuine conflict between science (the Book of Nature) and monotheistic religion (the Book 
of Scripture). Religious believers need not fear the discoveries of science, he asserts, as 
these do not jeopardize their faith. The study of either Book can enrich one’s understand-
ing of the other. Religion and the Sciences of Origins follows an endless spate of books on 
science and religion, most of them purporting to show that the twain can meet and live 
in harmony (see, for example, recent works by Alvin Plantinga, Alister McGrath, Michael 
Ruse, John Haught, and Kenneth Miller). Clark’s contribution, which is accessible for a lay 
audience and requires no special background, continues that theme. 
Th e Con fliCT Th e s i s
In this essay, I will focus on Clark’s central thesis about the relationship between science 
and religion: that the conflict view is hugely overblown, a fantasy of militant atheists and 
other culture warriors, and that both science and religion can co-exist in peaceful har-
mony, provided they stay on their respective turf. 
The root of the conflict view, according to Clark, is the thesis, defended by “New Atheists” 
such as Richard Dawkins, Jerry Coyne, and Victor Stenger, that God can be regarded as 
a scientific hypothesis that has failed to garner empirical support, or has even been deci-
sively refuted. Many phenomena that were previously attributed to divine intervention, or 
so defenders of the conflict view argue, are now understood in terms of perfectly natural 
processes. For Clark, this view is totally misguided: God is a person, and religious faith 
is more like belief in the existence of other minds, something that people directly intuit 
rather than infer from empirical data (readers familiar with Reformed epistemology will 
recognize Alvin Plantinga’s account about “properly basic belief”).  Clark’s claim that “God 
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is not a scientific hypothesis,” however, plays on an equivocation. To be sure, the God 
“hypothesis” does not look much like, say, the nebular hypothesis of the formation of the 
solar system. It did not arise from careful empirical investigation of nature, and religious 
believers who endorse such beliefs do not do so tentatively, after carefully examining the 
available evidence. A less polite way of saying this is that religious believers are intransi-
gent and dogmatic. In that sense, indeed, God is not a scientific hypothesis. But all that 
is irrelevant for the conflict view: belief in a supernatural Creator amounts to a scientific 
hypothesis in the sense that it has testable empirical consequences, is amenable to scien-
tific investigation, and would make a genuine difference for science if true (Fishman 2009). 
That is precisely the heart of the conflict thesis: religion makes factual claims about real-
ity, and hence encroaches on the domain of science. It is vying for the same explanatory 
domain, even if it does not remotely look like science. To think that God is “not on the sci-
entific radar” (Clark 2014:6), as Clark does, just because theism did not emerge as a result 
of the hypothetico-deductive method, is to conflate two very different things.
What about all the different ways in which science has contradicted religious scriptures? 
That is no problem, according to Clark, because “the Bible is not a textbook of science” 
and was never meant to be taken literally. Clark, apparently taking the divine origin of the 
Bible at face value (Clark 2014:77), argues that God had no choice but to stoop down to the 
intellectual level of his creatures when he chose to reveal himself to them. He had to speak 
in their own language. After all, if God had simply dictated the true mathematical descrip-
tion of the cosmos (Clark 2014:71), his Chosen People would have been dumbfounded. It 
is almost too obvious to remark that this is a false dilemma. If I were God, here is how I 
would start Genesis: “In the beginning the world burst forth from a huge explosion, and 
the light was so seething hot that nothing could survive.” As for the place of the Earth in 
the universe, surely even illiterate goat herders could understand something like this: “Be-
hold, the Earth under your feet is round like a sphere, and with every turn of the seasons 
it traces a path round the Sun, in the shape of an outstretched circle. And the Sun is like 
a burning hot furnace and far away from the earth, but the moon  is much closer.” (There 
are several scientifically sanitized versions of Genesis around: see Carver (2013) or Sagan 
(2006:ch 6) or the film clip “I know more than God” [https://youtu.be/4qymoktf0wY].) At 
any rate, this makes a lot more sense than most of the stuff from the Book of Revelation. 
A divine revelation does not need to be stuffed with equations to be consistent with the 
scientific facts. 
The most important distortion of science in this book, which is unfortunately also pro-
mulgated by high-profile scientific organizations such as the NCSE and the AAAS, is that 
science is by its very nature restricted to natural causes and explanations, and must remain 
studiously neutral on questions about the supernatural. God can never fail as a scientific 
hypothesis, or so the doctrine of methodological naturalism claims, because he never en-
tered the scientific arena in the first place. He may or may not exist, but science has no say 
on the matter. I think this is a politically convenient fiction, which does not survive philo-
sophical scrutiny and historical analysis (Edis 1998; Boudry, Blancke et al. 2010; Fishman 
and Boudry 2013). It has also backfired, because it creates the impression that science has 
unfairly excluded God (see the “intelligent design” propaganda movie Expelled) from seri-
ous consideration. The “intelligent design” folks had a field day with that one.
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The doctrine of methodological naturalism is just one among several straitjackets into 
which Clark wants to force science. In his view, science also assumes the non-existence 
of immaterial entities; it rules out personal (agential) explanations from consideration (ar-
chaeologists would be surprised); it presupposes the regularity of natural laws; it must 
favor simple theories over more complex ones; and it is inconceivable without the a priori 
assumption of the intelligibility of nature. But we need not adopt such inviolable meth-
odological strictures from the outset. Science is like Otto Neurath’s ship, being built and 
reconstructed along the way, out in the open sea. Indeed, Clark gets the story exactly 
backward: for example, why would scientists need to presuppose the regularity of nature, 
instead of adopting it as a working hypothesis that can be checked every time we consult 
nature (Fishman and Boudry 2013)? Is the preference for simplicity really just a quirk of 
scientists, an irreducible assumption, or could there be good probabilistic and evidential 
reasons for it (see for example, Forster and Sober 1994; Fishman and Boudry 2013)? Pace 
Clark, science does not carry an a priori bias against personal (agential) explanations for 
phenomena. Rather, as a result of centuries of scientific investigation, earlier animistic, 
anthropomorphic, and teleological views have gradually been superseded by more parsi-
monious, impersonal explanations. Putting the cart before the horse here quickly leads to 
absurdities. Why, for example, don’t we find scientists positing “teeny tiny elves” to account 
for the behavior of subatomic particles? For Clark, this is because of a scientific “prejudice 
… against persons as the causes of material reality” and a “value commitment to natural 
causes” (Clark 2014:18). In other words, if it were not for materialist “prejudice,” we could 
have had little elves reigning over the microscopic realm. (You can see Clark getting un-
comfortable with his own conclusion in the remainder of the passage quoted: “Prejudice,” 
he writes, is actually just a form of “prejudgment, which is not always bad, certainly not 
in the ruling out of tiny elf theory.” But why the pejorative “prejudice” then? What kind of 
reasons would Clark adduce to rule out elves, and why would those reasons not apply to 
God?)
hi sTory of war far e
This book contains many confident assertions that the received knowledge on the clashes 
between science and religion is completely wrong. Andrew Dickson White’s monumental 
A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896), which contains 
literally hundreds of examples of theology forestalling scientific progress, is brushed aside 
as “deeply flawed” (Clark 2014:24), but Clark never bothers to tell us exactly why. Perhaps 
we should have a look at one of the most famous episodes in this warfare, which Clark 
discusses at some length: Galileo’s quarrel with the Inquisition. The received story of the 
scientific hero being persecuted for heresy is dismissed as “nearly completely false” (Clark 
2014:46). Why? For starters, according to Clark, because Galileo himself was guilty of “ar-
rogance” and impertinent “sarcasm” in his Dialogues (Clark 2014:49), and because he had 
dared to step on the Pope’s toes. Also, his “timing was poor” (Clark 2014:51). Galileo, it 
should be borne in mind, was foolish enough to live in the aftermath of the Protestant 
Reformation, at a time when the Catholic Church had grown understandably anxious about 
dissident views. In short, Clark comes close to condoning the Inquisition and blaming 
Galileo for his temerity. The Church, you see, was genuinely concerned with the “eternal 
destiny” of its flock, which it would not allow philosophical “mavericks” like Galileo to 
jeopardize. “A kinder and gentler Galileo might have succeeded where the actual Galileo 
failed” (Clark 2014:51). More plausibly, such a gentler soul would have shut up about he-
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liocentrism in the first place, as the Inquisition, which had burned the heretic Giordano 
Bruno at the stake a mere sixteen years previously, was pressuring him to do. In Clark’s 
view, just because a scientist was condemned with heresy by the Holy Inquisition for de-
nying the literal truth of Scripture, and was being threatened with torture in the process, 
does not mean that there was a conflict between science and religion. It all boiled down 
to a “lack of scientific evidence” (Clark 2014:52). In Clark’s own words: “The conflict, and 
there surely was one, was more science versus science than science versus religion.” From 
reading Clark, you would almost believe that the Holy Inquisition was an early and exem-
plary model of academic peer review.
Th e DoCTr i n e of Th e Two Books
There is, however, an important complication in the standard story of the conflict between 
science and religion, which we should keep in mind. Many of the pioneers of the Scien-
tific Revolution, as Clark rightly points out, were devoutly religious men. These scientists 
reconciled their faith with their investigations of nature by upholding the Doctrine of the 
Two Books, to which Clark devotes considerable attention. According to this metaphor, 
famously used by Francis Bacon, Truth can never contradict Truth, so if the Book of Na-
ture seemed to be at odds with Scripture, we should blame our limited understanding 
of Scripture. But does this show that science and religion can live in harmony? Hardly. 
Bacon, along with luminaries such as Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle, was confident that 
investigations of the natural world would leave the basic tenets of the Bible intact. Perhaps 
some interpretations of specific verses would need to be abandoned, but all that was for 
the greater glory of God. Little did these devout men expect that their intellectual descen-
dants—modern scientists—eventually were to give up the young age of the Earth, the 
Flood, the miracle stories, the existence of Adam and Eve, the garden of Eden, the special 
creation of humans, the virgin birth, the Resurrection of Jesus, and just about every other 
factual tenet of Christianity. If they had foreseen what the Book of Nature had in store 
for them, and how it would tear the other Book to shreds, they might have paused before 
venturing on that road. 
With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that the Doctrine of the Two Books foreboded 
trouble from the very start, because it could only accommodate changes in one direction: 
from Nature to Scripture, never the other way around. The infallibility of Scripture, while 
still professed in principle, would eventually be reduced to a paper tiger. In Clark’s own 
defense of the Doctrine of the Two Books (Clark 2014:95–96), the message of Scripture 
seems to be whatever is left standing after the latest scientific developments, with the re-
mainder demoted to the status of metaphor and allegory. That raises the question: is there 
a single proposition in the Bible that Clark considers non-negotiable? And if so, on what 
basis? Perhaps Jesus never existed in the first place. If Adam was just a metaphor, why not 
his successor, the Second Adam?
Th e r eTr e aT of r e lig ion
Whenever scientific knowledge advances, religion is forced to retreat. The current posi-
tion occupied by many theologians who reject creationism (including “intelligent design”) 
is called theistic evolutionism: evolution by natural selection has occurred, but God was 
somehow keeping evolution on track, for example by fiddling with “random” mutations, 
conveniently ensuring that such interventions escape his creatures’ scientific efforts to de-
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tect them. Clark, although it is hard to pin him down, seems to be favorable to this view: 
“God could ensure … that mutations occur (through natural processes) as needed” (Clark 
2014:107). He also toys with various other models for allowing divine creativity even if 
mutations are “random” in the strong sense of being unpredictable. Never mind that there 
is not a scintilla of evidence for this directionality (though there could have been), or for 
some sort of “Riverboat Gambler” God behind the scenes (Clark 2014:110). 
What remains, then, of the Book of Scripture after Clark’s reconciliation with the Book of 
Nature? Well, the phrase “Let there be light” in Genesis can still be interpreted, with con-
siderable mental gymnastics, as God stooping down to humanity to inform us about Big 
Bang cosmology. There are also still a number of gaps in the fabric of the cosmos for God 
to fill up. Take the “fine tuning” arguments that are currently in vogue. The fundamen-
tal physical constants in our universe seem to lie within a very narrow range, outside of 
which the cosmos would not be conducive to the formation of matter and solar systems, let 
alone be hospitable to intelligent life. Surely this is a sign of God’s providence? However, 
even if we grant that life is viable only within a certain range of physical values, which is 
a premature conclusion at this point, there are plenty of natural explanations on offer for 
this appearance of fine-tuning (Carroll 2012). In the multiverse model arising from string 
theory, for example, the constants of nature vary from one place to the other, and the ex-
istence of certain life-conducive regions is a matter of sheer happenstance. Clark is aware 
of this possibility, and although he spends a whole chapter on fine-tuning arguments for 
the existence of God, at the same time he is already hedging his bets and anticipating the 
next retreat. If one of the multiverse models of the cosmos should be borne out, and fine-
tuning arguments would go out of the window, this, too, would comport well with theism: 
“God in his goodness may indeed have created everything—every possible kind of thing 
in the universe. … The multiverse might be the ultimate expression of divine goodness 
and creativity” (Clark 2014:205). So either God, in his loving providence, has created one 
universe carefully tailored for life, or in his infinite profligacy, has created a whole plethora 
of worlds, the finely tuned and the messed-up ones alike. Either way, praise be unto Him! 
This “heads I win, tails you lose” approach betrays a desperation to maintain a cherished 
belief at any cost, regardless of the evidence. Note also that by invoking the fine-tuning 
argument, Clark is tacitly conceding that evidence is in fact relevant to the God question—
thereby undermining his claim that God is not a scientific hypothesis. 
In science, this kind of reasoning would be met with ridicule, but for theology, being ”an-
other way of knowing,” different rules seem to apply. Towards the end of his book, Clark 
discusses one type of multiverse model, in which there is a succession of expanding and 
contracting universes, with the constants of nature being shuffled every time a collapsing 
universe turns into a freshly exploding one. Following an argument of Roger Penrose, 
Clark argues that the second law of thermodynamics (the inexorable rise of entropy in a 
closed system) would prevent life from arising in such a multiverse. After a few rounds of 
banging and crunching, after all, the usable energy (with low entropy) of such a multiverse 
would be depleted, leaving too little time and opportunity for the right physical conditions 
for life to arise by chance. So that natural explanation of fine-tuning falters as well, accord-
ing to Clark. But what about the resurrection of the dead, a prospect which he apparently 
takes seriously (Clark 2014:177–178)? Wouldn’t that be the most massive violation of the law 
of increasing entropy imaginable? Ah, but of course God can do whatever he likes, and he 
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is hardly accountable to such trifles as the laws of thermodynamics. Presumably he has an 
inexhaustible supply of usable energy, or infinite time and patience. As a mere mortal, my 
patience with this kind of apologetic nonsense is limited. 
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